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INTRODUCTION
The scope of the following survey is the Montana Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Montana Rules of Evidence in deci-
sions issued from January 1, 1981, to December 31, 1981. The au-
thor has selected those cases that indicate new trends, major devel-
opments or that otherwise are of practical importance to Montana
attorneys.
I. COMPLETENESS DOCTRINE: RULE 106
The Montana Supreme Court in Spraggins v. ElvidgeI held
Rule 1062 did not modify Montana parol evidence law.3 The court
also affirmed its earlier interpretation, made prior to the adoption
of the Rules of Evidence, of the completeness doctrine.4 The doc-
trine allows an adverse party, after his opponent has introduced
1. - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 1151 (1981).
2. MONT. R. EVID. 106 provides:
Remainder of or related acts, writings, or statements.
(a) When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or recorded statement
or series thereof is introduced by a party:
(1) an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part
of such item or series thereof which ought in fairness to be considered at that
time; or
(2) an adverse party may inquire into or introduce any other part of such
item of evidence or series thereof.
(b) This rule does not limit the right of any party to cross-examine or further
develop as part of his case matters covered by this rule.
3. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] §§ 28-2-904, 72-11-304
(1981); Leigland v. McGaffick, 135 Mont. 188, 338 P.2d 1037 (1959).
4. State Highway Comm'n v. Churchwell, 146 Mont. 52, 403 P.2d 751 (1965), constru-
ing, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA 1947 [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] § 93-401-11 (fore-
runner to Rule 106).
1
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into evidence a part of a writing, act, declaration or conversation,
to introduce into evidence any part of these items necessary to
make them understood in their proper context.5
The district court in Spraggins allowed the respondent and
his wife to testify in a contract dispute about an oral agreement
that allegedly preceded their written contract. Relying on Rule
106 and the testimony of the respondent and his wife, the court
found that the written contract not only covered the sale of the
real property described in the contract, but that it also settled a
previous business transaction between the appellant and respon-
dent that was not mentioned in the written contract.'
In reversing this finding, the Montana Supreme Court stated
that neither party had pleaded that the written contract was im-
perfect or claimed that it was invalid. Absent one of these claims,
parol evidence, according to the court, is inadmissible to vary or
alter the terms of a written contract.' The court characterized Rule
106 as a "procedural rule" that was never intended to allow a court
to admit parol evidence to modify a written contract." Because the
respondent had offered all of the writings constituting the con-
tract, Rule 106 was not applicable. Spraggins makes clear that,
even when Rule 106 is applicable to admit into evidence portions
of a written contract omitted by a party opponent, it does not in-
dependently sanction the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence
that varies or alters the terms of the written contract.
II. RELEVANCE: RULE 402
A. Blood Alcohol Tests
In McAlpine v. Midland Electric Co.,10 the Montana Supreme
Court held that laboratory blood analysis reports were admissible
into evidence because they were not required or supplemental acci-
dent reports, which are inadmissible under Montana Code Anno-
tated [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 61-7-114 (1981). The court had
previously held that this statute made all required accident reports
and supplemental reports inadmissible in a civil or criminal trial.11
5. MONT. R. EVID. 106 states the completeness doctrine.
6. Spraggins, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d at 1152.
7. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 1153.
8. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 1153-54.
9. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 1155.
10. - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 1166, 1169 (1981), (Daly, J., dissenting without opinion)
(reversed because of improper jury instruction).
11. Morrison v. City of Butte, 150 Mont. 106, 112-13, 413 P.2d 79, 82-83 (1967) (con-
struing R.C.M. 1947 § 32-1213 (Supp. 1977), current version at MCA § 61-7-114 (1981)).
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McAlpine involved a wrongful death action in which the
widow of the passenger killed in an automobile accident brought
suit against both the owner of a truck and trailer involved in the
accident and the State of Montana. The district court admitted
into evidence, over appellant's objection, the laboratory blood alco-
hol analysis reports of appellant's decedent and the driver of the
automobile in which he was a passenger. 2 Although the appellant
did not base her objection on MCA § 61-7-114 (1981), the court
nevertheless considered, on appellant's appeal from a judgment for
defendants, whether the laboratory reports were required or sup-
plemental accident reports.
The laboratory reports are not required accident reports, the
court concluded, because the laboratory test form stated that giv-
ing a blood sample is voluntary.' They are not supplemental., the
court reasoned, because the Division of Motor Vehicles may not
require a driver to file a completed laboratory test form to supple-
ment a prior insufficient accident report. 4 Additionally, the court
noted that the form did not indicate it was part of an accident
report, and when filled in, it did not suggest that it was part of an
accident report.15
The court discussed why information given or discovered in
completing an accident report required by the Uniform Accident
Reporting Act' is admissible, even though the contents of a re-
quired report 17 are inadmissible under MCA § 61-7-114 (1981). 1'
Before the court were two opposing lines of authority. In a Florida
case cited by appellant, Cooper v. State,9 the court construed a
Florida statute,20 almost identical to Montana's statute, mandating
the confidentiality of required accident reports. There the court
12. McAlpine, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 1168-69. The case report does not indicate
on what basis appellant objected.
13. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 1169.
14. Id. (quoting MCA § 61-7-109(2) (1981)). The investigating officer did not use the
exact blood alcohol figures on the laboratory report to complete his report. Id. at -, 634
P.2d at 1170.
15. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 1169.
16. MCA §§ 61-7-101 through -117(1981).
17. MCA § 61-7-109 (1981) requires the operators of motor vehicles involved in acci-
dents and investigating officers to complete and submit accident reports to the Division of
Motor Vehicles.
18. Although an accident report would generally be relevant in an action based on a
reported accident, MONT. R. EVID. 402 makes otherwise relevant evidence inadmissible if its
admission is excluded by statute. Cf. MONT. R. EVID. 803(8) (investigative reports by police
are not within public records exception to hearsay rule).
19. 183 So.2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
20. FLA. STAT. § 317.171 (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.066 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1982)).
1982] 303
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held that information obtained to make a required accident report
"speak the facts" was inadmissible regardless of the source of that
information.2 1 The Montana Supreme Court rejected this holding
as an improper interpretation of Montana's statute, stating that
the logic of the Cooper court would "require the exclusion of any
information, regardless of its source, which contributed to the com-
pletion of a required report. '2 2 Instead, the court adopted the rea-
soning in a California case, Stroud v. Hansen,'2 in which a Califor-
nia court construed a California statute,24 almost identical to
Montana's statute, mandating the confidentiality of required acci-
dent reports. The Stroud court held that "'[n]o evidence of the
facts that occurred at the time of a vehicular accident is privileged.
Only those reports are confidential which are so made by [the
Code].' "25
McAlpine promotes two policies. Keeping required accident
reports confidential encourages drivers to comply with Montana
law.26 Secondly, it does not deny the trier of fact information nec-
essary for an adjudication on the merits, simply because the infor-
mation found its way into a required report.
Additionally, McAlpine, by implication, authorizes an investi-
gating officer to testify on the basis of his personal knowledge even
if the information that he discloses is also contained in a required
or supplemental report.2 7 What McAlpine leaves unanswered is
whether a required or supplemental accident report may be used
to refresh the memory of a witness or may be used as a recorded
recollection.28
21. Cooper, 183 So.2d at 272, quoted in McAlpine, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 1169.
22. McAlpine, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 1169.
23. 48 Cal. App. 2d 556, 120 P.2d 102 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
24. 1935 Cal. Stats. ch. 27 § 488 (current version at CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 20012, 20013
(West 1971 & Supp. 1981)).
25. Stroud, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 560, 120 P.2d at 104, quoted in McAlpine, - Mont.
-, 634 P.2d at 1170.
26. The court recognized this policy in Morrison, 150 Mont. at 113, 431 P.2d at 83.
27. See Stroud, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 560, 120 P.2d at 104 (testimony by investigating
officer as to statements of driver involved in accident not part of required report and, there-
fore, admissible).
28. Given the prohibition in MCA § 61-7-114(3) (1981) and the requirements of MONT.
R. EVID. 612, arguably a trial court could deny a witness an opportunity to use a required
accident report to refresh his memory or the court could strike the testimony of a witness
who had used a required accident report to refresh his memory. The California Supreme
Court has held that an investigating officer may use a required accident report to refresh his
memory. Robinson v. Cable, 55 Cal. 2d 425, 359 P.2d 929, 11 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1961).
Additionally, given the prohibition in MCA § 61-7-114(3) (1981) and the language in
MoNr R. EvID. 803(5), one may reasonably argue that a court should not allow a party to
use a required accident report as a recorded recollection or allow an adverse party to offer it
as an exhibit.
[Vol. 43
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In holding that the blood alcohol test results were admissible,
the court also clarified the foundation necessary for their admis-
sion in a civil trial. 9 The appellant in McAlpine argued that the
test results lacked a proper foundation because the respondents
had not shown that the sampling and testing were done in accor-
dance with the procedures established in the Administrative Rules
of Montana.3 0 The court held that adherence to these safeguards is
not a precondition to the admissibility of blood alcohol test results
in a civil case:
Under section 61-8-401, MCA, a presumption of being under
the influence of alcohol may arise if a defendant's blood alcohol
reaches a certain level. This presumption may be used in an effort
to convict a person of the charge of driving while intoxicated. A
criminal defendant is entitled to the procedural safeguards pro-
vided by the ARM before such a presumption is applied. It does
not follow that the same safeguards must be employed when
blood test results are used in a civil case.31
A party seeking to introduce into evidence blood alcohol test
results must at a minimum demonstrate that the person who took
the blood sample "followed good practice in the field. '82 From Mc-
Alpine one may reasonably infer that good field practice involves
drawing a sample in a way which prevents contamination and dilu-
tion and which otherwise ensures a representative sample and a
reliable result. 3
B. Psychologist-Client Privilege
In a case that may prompt further litigation, the Montana Su-
See generally Title, Police Accident Reports: A Collision Between the California Vehi-
cle and Evidence Codes, 43 J. ST. B. CAL. 711 (1968).
29. Under MONT. R. EVID. 901(a) a proper foundation (i.e., authentication) is a condi-
tion precedent to the admission of evidence and a party proffering evidence satisfies the
condition by showing that a profferred item is what he claims it to be.
30. McAlpine, - Mont.'-, 634 P.2d at 1170. The procedures referred to are cur-
rently codified at ADMINISTRATIVE RULES OF MONTANA § 23.3.931. The procedures are aimed
at preventing contamination, dilution or spoilage of the sample, and at ensuring the sample
is properly identified.
31. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 1171.
32. Id.
33. Id. at-, 634 P.2d at 1170-71. Cf. Banner v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 150 Mont. 97, 104,
430 P.2d 648, 651-52 (1967). The Benner court held the trial court improperly admitted into
evidence blood alcohol test results because the tube in which the samples were taken had
held, prior to a wash with clear water and soap, formalin and formaldehyde. According to an
expert witness, the modified Nicloux test used was a volatility test, which would show a
higher alcohol content than actually existed if the formalin or formaldehyde were still pre-
sent. The gas chromatography test used in McAlpine apparently eliminates this problem.
McAlpine, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 1171.
1982]
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preme Court, in Matter of A.J.S., 4 adopted a test for determining
the existence of a psychologist-client relationship that will reveal
the existence of a statutory psychologist-client privilege.8 5 The
court effectively abolished the privilege for court-ordered psycho-
logical evaluations in abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings.,
In Matter of A.J.S., the appellant argued that her motion in
limine to exclude the testimony of the psychologist who examined
her should have been granted, because her communications with
the psychologist were privileged. A psychologist examined her by
order of the trial court in an abuse and neglect proceeding. The
supreme court held there was no privilege because there was no
psychologist-client relationship. The court rejected the appellant's
two-part test for the existence of a psychologist-client relationship:
trust in the psychologist coupled with an expectation of confidenti-
ality.3 7 The relationship exists, according to the court, only if a
person seeks out a psychologist for professional help, and if his
communications are aimed at securing professional help. The psy-
chologist-client privilege did not exist because the appellant saw
the psychologist by order of the court, and because the communi-
cations were directed at evaluating the appellant as part of the
abuse and neglect proceeding. 88
Noting that the appellant and the psychologist had previously
communicated in an unrelated matter, the court, in dicta, dis-
cussed the psychologist-client privilege as it relates generally to
abuse and neglect proceedings.3 9 Because the rights of a mother
are not absolute and because the best interests and welfare of a
child are paramount, a district court, in this type of proceeding,
must balance40 the rights of each. In the instant case, "even assum-
ing arguendo, that the previous contacts did establish a psycholo-
gist-client relationship, it was yet within the discretion of the dis-
34. - Mont. -, 630 P.2d 217 (1981).
35. MCA § 26-1-807 (1981) provides:
The confidential relations and communications between a psychologist and his cli-
ent shall be placed on the same basis as provided by law for those between an
attorney and his client. Nothing in any act of the legislature shall be construed to
require such privileged communications to be disclosed.
36. An abuse and neglect proceeding is a civil action (MCA § 41-3-401(3) (1981)), the
purpose of which is to implement the declared policy of the State of Montana "to provide
for the protection of children whose health and welfare are or may be adversely affected and
further threatened by the conduct of those responsible for their care and protection." MCA
§ 41-3-101(2) (1981).
37. Matter of A.J.S., - Mont. -, 630 P.2d at 221.
38. Id. (citing Bernardi v. Community Hospital Assoc., 166 Colo. 280, 295-96, 443 P.2d
708, 715-16 (1968)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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trict court to consider the testimony" of the psychologist." This
discretionary power, according to the court, arises from a "'court's
inherent power to do what is best to protect the welfare of the
infant.' ",42 From the supreme court's discussion of the psycholo-
gist-client privilege in an abuse and neglect proceeding, it appears
that the legislature is powerless' 5 to keep court-ordered, psycholo-
gist-client communications confidential, when those communica-
tions are relevant to this type of proceeding."
The court refused to decide on appeal the question of whether
the admission into evidence of the psychologist's testimony vio-
lated the appellant's constitutional right of privacy,'45 because the
appellant failed to raise the issue in district court.4' Only further
litigation can reveal whether some form of psychologist-client priv-
ilege, albeit under the guise of a constitutional right of privacy,
exists in abuse and neglect proceedings. Only the constitutional
claim remains as a possible means by which a person may success-
fully exclude the testimony of his psychologist, regarding the re-
sults of a court-ordered evaluation in an abuse and neglect
proceeding.
41. Id. It is unclear whether a court could consider the testimony of a psychologist
who had a psychologist-client relationship with a party and who had not also examined the
party at court order. But the language in Matter of A.J.S. arguably permits this.
42. Id. (quoting People v. Fitzgerald, 40 Misc. 2d 966, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 441, 442 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1968)). In invoking the inherent power of a court to protect the welfare of a youth,
the Fitzgerald court relied on People ex rel. Fields v. Kaufmann, 9 A.D. 2d 375, 193 N.Y.S.
2d 789 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959).
43. Not only is the legislature powerless, it is apparently also unwilling to keep psy-
chologist-client communications confidential when the client is a child in an abuse, neglect
or dependency proceeding. MCA § 41-3-404(3) (1981); see generally MCA §§ 42-3-204(1),
50-16-314 (1), (2)(c), (d) (1981).
44. MCA § 41-3-403(1)(a), (2)(b) (1981) authorizes a court, once a county attorney
files a petition for protective services and temporary investigative authority (MCA § 41-3-
402 (1981)), to order a parent to submit to a psychological evaluation.
Additionally, because the Rules of Civil Procedure, except where modified by statute,
apply in an abuse and neglect proceeding (MCA § 41-3-401(3) (1981)), and because a parent
is a party in this type of proceeding (MCA § 41-3-401(4), (5) (1981)), the party filing the
petition allejong abuse and neglect arguably could frame the petition in a way that places
the mental condition of the parent in controversy and then move the court under Mown. R.
Civ. P. 35 for a mental examination of the parent.
Using either or both of these tactics, a moving party could try to force a parent to
undergo a psychological evaluation and then have the psychologist testify against the
parent.
45. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 provides: "Right of privacy. The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest."
46. Matter of A.J.S., - Mont. -, 630 P.2d at 221-22.
7
Jones: Evidence
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1982
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
C. Medical Malpractice Panel
The Montana Supreme Court struck down a statutory excep-
tion to the admission of relevant evidence in a decision which up-
held the constitutionality of the Montana Medical Malpractice
Panel Act.4 7 In Linder v. Smith,48 the plaintiff, in an original pro-
ceeding before the court, sought a declaratory judgment regarding
the constitutionality of the Act.49 The panel created by the Act
screens claims of medical malpractice and makes a preliminary
evaluation of the merits of a claim; it then tries to encourage the
parties to reach a settlement.50 To accomplish this two-fold pur-
pose, the panel is authorized to conduct hearings.51 Prior to Lin-
der, under MCA § 27-6-704(2) (1981), the statement of any person
made during a hearing could not later be used for impeachment.2
To uphold the constitutionality of the Act, the court had to sever
this statutory exception to the admissibility of otherwise relevant
evidence.5 " The court held "[iut is fundamental to our adversarial
system that litigants retain the right to impeach the sworn testi-
mony of a witness testifying against them. ' 54 Without this right, it
is unlikely, the court reasoned, that a litigant can get a full and fair
hearing in court.
III. OTHER CRIMES: RULE 404(b)
The Montana Supreme Court continued to follow the substan-
tive limitations and procedural requirements it imposed in State v.
Just5 5 on the admissibility, in a criminal proceeding, of evidence of
other crimes.56 The Just limitations permit the admission of evi-
dence of another crime only if it: (1) is similar to the crime
47. MCA §§ 27-6-101 through -704 (1981).
48. - Mont. -, 629 P.2d 1187 (1981).
49. Id. at -, 629 P.2d at 1188-89. The plaintiff alleged nine constitutional violations.
50. MCA § 27-6-102 (1981).
51. MCA §§ 27-6-501 through -503 (1981).
52. MCA § 27-6-704(2) (1981) provides:
No statement made by any person during a hearing before the panel may be used
as impeaching evidence in court. The decision of the medical review panel is not
admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought in any court of law.
See MONT. R. EvID. 801(d)(1).
53. Linder, __ Mont. -, 629 P.2d at 1192.
54. Id.
55. - Mont. -, 602 P.2d 957, 961-64 (1979).
56. MONT. R. EvID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
[Vol. 43
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charged, (2) is near in time to the crime charged, (3) tends to es-
tablish a common scheme, plan or system, and (4) does not create
a prejudicial effect which outweighs its probative value.", The Just
court's procedural requirements mandate notice to a defendant
that evidence of another crime will be introduced and an explana-
tion to a jury of the limited purpose of the evidence."
In State v. Wurtz" the appellant was charged with intimida-
tion.60 During his trial the district court admitted into evidence the
testimony of a woman who had been the victim of a prior and un-
related sexual assault by the appellant.61 The intimidation victim
testified that the appellant made obscene and intimidating com-
ments as he pursued her in his car. The assault victim testified
that, prior to the assault, the appellant had made obscene com-
ments and a suggestive gesture while pursuing her in his car.
The court, applying the Just limitations, held the testimony of
the assault victim was admissible to prove motive, intent and a
common scheme.2 Noting that the incidents were similar and not
commonplace,"s the court stated that the nine months between
incidents did not make the assault too remote in time, and that
the prejudicial effect of the testimony was sufficiently reduced by
the district court's compliance with the Just procedural require-
ments. 4
Because the other crime testimony admitted in Wurtz dealt
with sexual assault, a crime different in kind from the crime with
which the appellant was charged (intimidation), Wurtz may signal
the court's willingness to apply the Just limitations more liberally
in favor of allowing the admission of evidence of other crimes.66 At
the same time, Wurtz continues the court's practice of applying
the Just similarity limitation on the basis of the particular facts of
each case.66
57. Just, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 961.
58. Id. at -, 602 P.2d at 962-64.
59. - Mont. -, 636 P.2d 246 (1981) (Morrison, Shea, J.J., dissenting).
60. Id. at -_, 636 P.2d at 248. The Wurtz court upheld the constitutionality of MCA §
4 5-5-203(1)(c) (1981).
61. Id. In an unrelated and prior case the appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault.
62. Id. at __, 636 P.2d at 251.
63. Id. Cf. State v. Hansen, - Mont. -. , 608 P.2d 1083, 1085-86 (1980) (alleged
twisting of rape victim's thumb against her wrist to force intercourse not distinctive enough
to remove it from events common to rape).
64. Id.
65. See generally Survey, Montana Supreme Court Survey of 1981 Civil Procedure
and Evidence, 42 MoNT. L. REv. 343, 356-58 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Survey].
66. One may reasonably anticipate that, as the court continues to construe Rule
404(b), it will develop a catalogue of features common to the commission of certain crimes
as well as a rogues gallery of offenders whose flair for the distinctive places them within the
1982] 309
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The Wurtz court also approved a slight departure from a pro-
cedural requirement it had mandated in Just.6 7 The prosecution in
Wurtz notified the appellant, before trial, that it would introduce
evidence of another crime to prove motive, intent of common
scheme or plan,"' but the court instructed the jury that it could
consider this evidence as proof of identity, motive or intent. The
purpose behind the notice requirement is to prevent surprise; the
court held that the appellant was neither surprised nor prejudiced,
because having raised the defense of alibi he had put the identity
of the perpetrator at issue."'
State v. Casagranda70 contains another example of evidence of
"other wrongs" under Rule 404(b)71 and illustrates a situation in
which a defense counsel does not waive his right to object to the
admission of evidence of other wrongs, even though it was the de-
fense counsel's questioning of a prosecution witness that elicited
the evidence of other wrongs.
During the appellant's trial for aggravated burglary, the appel-
lant's counsel on cross-examination asked the investigating officer
if he found anything in his search of the appellant's apartment
that connected him to the burglary (i.e., "fruits of the crime"). 2
The officer testified that he found a pharmaceutical bottle similar
to the ones used at the burglarized pharmacy.78 Additional ques-
tioning of the officer and the pharmacy owner revealed that the
bottle could not be directly connected with the burglarized phar-
macy. 4 On redirect examination, the pharmacy owner testified
that the type of bottle in question was only used to store narcotic
substances and was not the type in which prescriptions were dis-
pensed.75 Over the objection of the appellant, the district court ad-
mitted into evidence the pharmaceutical bottle found in the appel-
lant's apartment and, for demonstrative purposes, another
reach of Rule 404(b).
67. The Just court, - Mont. -, 602 P.2d at 963-64, stated:
Evidence of other crimes may not be received unless there has been notice to
the defendant that such evidence is to be introduced.. .. Additionally, the no-
tice to the defendant shall include a statement as to the purposes for which such
evidence is to be admitted.
68. Wurtz, - Mont. , 636 P.2d at 252.
69. Id.
70. - Mont. -, 637 P.2d 826 (1981).
71. See supra note 56.
72. Casagranda, - Mont. -, 637 P.2d at 827.
73. Id.
74. Id. at -, 637 P.2d at 827-28.
75. Id. at -, 637 P.2d at 828.
[Vol. 43
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identical to it."6
The court reasoned that the bottle from the appellant's apart-
ment and the testimony concerning it were evidence of other
wrongs or acts, because the jury could infer from this evidence that
the bottle was used for narcotics and that the appellant had ille-
gally obtained it. 7 7 For this reason, admission of the bottles was
"severely prejudicial." The court never explicitly held that the bot-
tles and testimony concerning them were inadmissible. Because the
court also found that the testimony of the appellant's alleged ac-
complice was insufficiently corroborated by other evidence, it is
unclear if the court reversed and dismissed the charges because of
the improperly admitted evidence, the lack of corroboration, or
both.
Although it was appellant's cross-examination that first
broached the issue of the pharmaceutical bottle, the appellant was
not estopped from alleging, as error, the admission of the bottles
for two reasons: (1) the investigating officer's response was "unso-
licited" and (2) appellant's subsequent questioning of the officer
and the pharmacist was directed at explaining the matter raised in
the unsolicited answer. 8
IV. WITHDRAWN PLEA OF GUILTY: RULE 410
Construing for the first time Rule 410,79 which governs the ad-
missibility of a withdrawn plea of guilty, the Montana Supreme
Court followed both the express language of the rule and the Com-
mission Comment explaining it. The appellant in State v. Han-
sen 0 had entered a guilty plea to a charge of sexual intercourse
76. Id. at -, 637 P.2d at 828-29.
77. Id. The court treated the evidence as character evidence, although it did not ex-
pressly characterize the evidence in this way.
78. Id. (citing State v. Tiedemann, 139 Mont. 237, 243, 245, 362 P.2d 529, 532-33
(1961); State v. Rivers, 133 Mont. 129, 135, 320 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1958)).
79. Morr. R. EvID. 410 provides:
Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or
of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other
crime, or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or
offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal action, case, or proceeding against
the person who made the plea or offer. This rule shall not apply to the introduc-
tion of voluntary and reliable statements made in court on the record in connec-
tion with any of the foregoing pleas or offers where offered for impeachment pur-
poses or in a subsequent prosecution of the declarant for perjury or false
statement.
The Montana rule differs from the federal rule in that it does not expressly require as a
precondition to admissibility that a plea of guilty have been made under oath and in the
presence of counsel. MONT. R. EVID. 410, Commission Comment.
80. - Mont. -, 633 P.2d 1202 (1981).
1982]
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without consent, which the district court later withdrew after the
appellant, according to the presentence investigation report, de-
nied having sexual intercourse with the complaining witness.81 At
the subsequent trial, the appellant testified he did not, without
consent, have sexual intercourse with the complaining witness; the
prosecution then introduced into evidence statements made by the
appellant at the prior proceeding."2
Noting that these statements were introduced for impeach-
ment purposes, the court then adopted standards for determining
whether, under Rule 410, the appellant's prior statements were
"voluntary and reliable."83 Statements made in connection with a
prior plea of guilty are "voluntary and reliable" and therefore ad-
missible only if they are not compelled by threats, violence, direct
or indirect promises or improper influence."4 As evidence that
these standards were not violated, the court cited the trial judge's
explanation" to the appellant of his right to a trial, of the charge
against him,86 including lesser included offenses,87 and of the maxi-
mum possible sentence he could receive. In holding the appellant's
prior statements admissible," the court in effect adopted a "total-
ity of the circumstances" test to determine voluntariness and
81. Id. at -, 633 P.2d at 1204.
82. Id.
83. MoNT. R. EVID. 410.
84. Hansen, - Mont. -, 633 P.2d at 1205 (quoting Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28
(1976)). Ross involved statements made by a defendant confessing to the crime charged
after he and the prosecution reached a plea bargaining agreement. The defendant later
withdrew from the agreement and the prosecution introduced these statements into evi-
dence at the subsequent trial. The Court held that a plea bargain does not per se make a
subsequent confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible.
85. Id. at -, 633 P.2d at 1205-06.
86. MCA § 46-12-204(2) (1981) provides: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty and shall not accept the plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is vol-
untary with an understanding of the charge."
The court's discussion of this statutory requirement in Hansen, __ Mont. -, 633 P.2d
at 1208, suggests that unless a defendant understands the charge against him, his plea of
guilty cannot be voluntary. Stated differently, a defendant's guilty plea that was not com-
pelled by threats, violence, direct or indirect promises or improper influence might never-
theless be involuntary if he entered the plea not understanding the charge against him. If
this interpretation of Hansen is correct, then a defendant's understanding of the charge
against him is a standard that must be added to the others, and a failure to demonstrate
compliance with this standard would, presumably, bar the use for impeachment purposes of
statements made by a defendant in a prior proceeding in which he had entered a plea of
guilty.
For an example of successful compliance with MCA § 46-12-204(2) (1981), see State v.
White, - Mont. -, 632 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (1981).
87. Unless an explanation of lesser included offenses is given to a defendant, he can-
not, as a matter of law, understand the charge against him. State v. Azure, 175 Mont. 189,
194-96, 573 P.2d 179, 182-83 (1977).
88. Hansen, - Mont. -, 633 P.2d at 1208.
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reliability.
Additionally, Hansen expressly endorses the policy, stated in
the Commission Comment to Rule 410, of penalizing a defendant
who would abuse the plea bargain process by contradicting at trial
earlier statements made by him in connection with a plea of guilty
that he later withdraws. 89
V. EXPERT TESTIMONY: RULES 701-705
Relying on a test announced in a case pre-dating the adoption
of the Rules of Evidence, the Montana Supreme Court in State v.
Howard" imposed a new limitation on the subject matter about
which an expert may testify.91
The appellant in Howard was convicted of aggravated assault
and kidnapping after having been charged with attempted homi-
cide, aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse without con-
sent.9 2 The physician who examined the victim testified regarding
the nature and extent of the victim's injuries. The physician also
stated, over appellant's objection, his opinion of what the victim's
assailant intended to do. He testified "that somebody tried to mur-
der her."93
Noting that Rule 70 4 " makes "otherwise admissible" expert
testimony unobjectionable, even though it may address a question
to be decided by a jury, the court nevertheless found that the dis-
trict court erred in admitting the physician's opinion.' 5 Quoting
State v. Campbell," the court reasoned 97 that the jury was as ca-
89. Id. at -, 633 P.2d at 1204, 1207. The court quoted extensively from MoNT. R.
Evm. 410, Commission Comment, and relied almost exclusively on it in holding the defen-
dant's earlier statements admissible.
90. - Mont. _ 637 P.2d 15 (1981).
91. MoNT. R. Evm. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
92. Howard, - Mont. -, 637 P.2d at 16.
93. Id. at -, 637 P.2d at 17.
94. MoNT. R. EvW. 704 provides: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces. an ultimate issue to be de-
cided by the trier of fact."
95. Howard, - Mont. -, 637 P.2d at 17-18. The error was harmless because in con-
victing the defendant of lesser included offenses the jury did not rely on the physician's
testimony regarding intent.
96. 146 Mont. 251, 258, 405 P.2d 978, 983 (1965). The Campbell court stated:
The basic rule on the admissibility of expert opinion is whether the subject is one
of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach a conclu-
sion as intelligently as the witness, or whether the matter is sufficiently beyond
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.
19821
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pable as the witness to infer the intent of the victim's assailant
from the nature and extent of her injuries."8 While the rule fol-
lowed in Howard is consistent with prior Montana case law, the
court limited the subject matter of a physician's opinion. An opin-
ion of an assailant's intent based on an examination of the injuries
sustained by his victim is not a proper subject for expert
testimony.
The court, apparently for the first time since the adoption of
the Rules of Evidence, also indicated the bases on which an expert
may give opinion testimony. " In State v. Close,'00 the appellant
argued that the district court should have sustained his objection
to allowing a pathologist to state his opinion on how the blows that
killed the victim were administered. The pathologist based his
opinion on photographs which were taken out of his presence. 10'
Reasoning that the pathologist was an expert, the court held that
he could base his opinion regarding the fatal blows on "actual ob-
servations, photographs and other tests."''1
VI. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT: RULE 801
Although State v. Fitzpatrick'03 appeared to settle the mean-
ing and application of Rule 801(d)(1)(A),' 0' the Montana Supreme
Court in State v. White Water0 5 clarified the broad language in its
(citations omitted).
97. Howard, __ Mont. __, 637 P.2d at 17.
98. Compare Leybold v. Foxx Butte Theater Corp., 103 Mont. 232, 62 P.2d 223 (1936)
(safety of swinging doors not a matter for expert testimony) and Ployhar v. Board of Trust-
ees of Missoula, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1226 (1980) (only if cause of accident is complex or
beyond common experience may witness give opinion testimony).
99. MoNT. R. EvID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in a particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
Although the appellant challenged the basis of the pathologist's opinion, the court
neither relied on nor cited MoNT. R. EVwD. 703.
100. - Mont. -, 623 P.2d 940 (1981).
101. Id. at -, 623 P.2d at 946.
102. Id. Given the appellant's argument and the court's ruling, Close is authority for
the meaning of MoNT. R. EvID. 703 and is consistent with prior Montana law. MoNT. R.
EvID. 703, Commission Comment.
103. - Mont. -, 606 P.2d 1343 (1980).
104. MONT. R. EVD. 801 provides in part: A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior
statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testi-
mony. .. "
105. - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 636 (1981).
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holding in Fitzpatrick,°6 regarding the admissibility of a prior in-
consistent statement as substantive evidence. Additionally, the
court stated, in dictum, that Rule 801(d)(1)(A) imposes a "suffi-
ciency limitation" that precludes a criminal convition, if the only
evidence supporting the conviction is a prior inconsistent
statement. 107
The respondent in White Water was charged with sexual in-
tercourse without consent.108 The only evidence in support of one
element of the offense 0 9 was an unsworn statement taken by the
sheriff in the presence of a state-employed social worker during an
interview with the alleged victim.110 In her testimony at the jury
trial, the alleged victim repudiated the assertions she allegedly
made in the statement."' Both the sheriff and the social worker
testified that the alleged victim made the assertions recorded in
the statement. " At the close of the State's case, the trial judge
dismissed the charge, reasoning that because the alleged victim
had repudiated the assertions contained in the statement there was
no evidence to prove one of the elements of the offense. "
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal holding
that "[a]n unreliable prior inconsistent statement should not be
the sole, substantive evidence upon which a jury should be allowed
to base guilt. 11 4 The alleged victim in White Water has a "learn-
ing disability" and was "somewhat susceptible to agree with sug-
gestions made to her when she cannot clearly verbalize her
thoughts.""1 5
The court in Fitzpatrick held that a prior inconsistent state-
ment is admissible as substantive evidence, if the declarant is sub-
ject to cross-examination while testifying at a trial." The court's
holding in White Water appears to make reliability,117 at least in a
106. See generally Survey, supra note 65, at 364-65.
107. White Water, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 639.
108. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 637. See MCA §§ 45-2-101(61), 45-5-503 (1981).
109. The element was penetration and the alleged victim allegedly stated during the
interview that the respondent penetrated her vagina with his finger. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at
637-38.
110. Id.
111. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 637.
112. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 638.
113. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 637; see MCA § 46-16-403 (1981) (motion to dismiss).
114. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 638.
115. 'd.
116. Fitzpatrick, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d at 1349.
117. The court's analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) suggests that reliability has always been
a precondition to the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement. "'In many cases, the
inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the testimony of the witness at trial
because it was made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be
1982] EVIDENCE 315
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criminal case,118 an additional precondition to the admissibility of
a prior inconsistent statement and to a jury's consideration of the
statement as substantive evidence.
In imposing this reliability requirement,11 ' the court at-
tempted to make clear that it was not suggesting that a prior in-
consistent statement is per se unreliable:
The question is not whether one sort of statement carries a
greater indicia of reliability than another, but rather, whether the
circumstances pursuant to which the prior statement was given,
coupled with the present availability of the witness for observa-
tion and cross-examination under oath, provide sufficient reliabil-
ity for admitting that statement as substantive evidence.'"
Although White Water involved only the admissibility, as sub-
stantive evidence, of an unreliable prior inconsistent statement,
the court expressed itself regarding the situation where a reliable
prior inconsistent statement is the only evidence supporting a
criminal conviction."' By way of anticipation, the court stated,
"[w]e believe, furthermore, that a conviction supported only by a
prior inconsistent statement should not be allowed to stand." '2
Rule 801(d)(1)(A), according to the court, imposes a "sufficiency
limitation" that prevents the state from obtaining a criminal con-
viction solely on the basis of an otherwise admissible prior incon-
sistent statement.128
influenced by the controversy that gave rise to the litigation.'" White Water, - Mont. -,
634 P.2d at 638 (quoting Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 296 (1972)).
118. Because White Water was a criminal case and because the court limited its dis-
cussion to criminal cases, only further litigation will reveal whether a party in a civil case
may object to the use of a prior inconsistent statement on the ground that it is unreliable.
119. White Water, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 639 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 163-64 n.15 (1970); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945)). In imposing this
reliability requirement the court relied on what it termed "due process considerations." Id.
120. Id. Presumably further litigation will indicate what other circumstances are indic-
ative of unreliability. The court twice indicated that the prior statement was unsworn. Id. at
-, 634 P.2d at 638. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not require as a condition of admissibility that
a prior inconsistent statement must have been made under oath. MoNT. R. Evm.
801(d)(1)(A), Commission Comment. Even if the prior statement in White Water had been
made under oath, its reliability would not have increased because the unreliability was
caused by a mental disability.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 16 n.21 (1974)) reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7051, 7062 and 4 WEmNSTEIN's EviDENCE, 801-73 n.53
(1975) (1981 pagination 801-86 n.15); Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent State-
ments Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3, 21 (1975)).
123. Id.
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